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Price Cutting in Liability Insurance Markets
Abstract
This article analyzes alleged underpricing of general liability insurance prior to the mid-1980s liability
insurance "crisis." The theoretical analysis considers whether moral hazard and/or heterogeneous information
for forecasting claim costs can cause some firms to price too low and depress other firms' prices. Cross-
sectional analysis of insurer loss forecast revisions (which should be greater for firms with low prices caused by
moral hazard or hetero- geneous information) and premium growth provides evidence consistent with low
pricing due to moral hazard but not heterogeneous information. The evidence also implies that shifts in the
loss distribution produced large industrywide forecast errors.
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 Price Cutting in Liability
 Insurance Markets*
 I. Introduction
 The commercial general liability (GL) insurance
 market (which includes product liability insur-
 ance) experienced sharp increases in premium
 rates, limited availability of coverage, and modi-
 fications in coverage terms during the mid-1980s.
 This "crisis" or "hard market" was preceded by
 a "soft market" with declining premium rates
 and deteriorating insurer financial results in the
 early 1980s. The hard market coincided with
 large upward revisions in reported claim liabili-
 ties for GL policies sold in prior years. Consider-
 able debate has addressed whether this volatility
 in insurance prices and availability can be fully
 explained by changes in discounted expected
 costs of providing coverage, and, if not, possible
 causes of variation.
 Many industry analysts believe that the early
 1980s soft market for GL insurance represented
 a particularly severe episode of price cutting to
 preserve market share. According to this view,
 price cutting resulted in premium rates that were
 This article analyzes al-
 leged underpricing of
 general liability insur-
 ance prior to the mid-
 1980s liability insur-
 ance "crisis." The
 theoretical analysis con-
 siders whether moral
 hazard and/or heteroge-
 neous information for
 forecasting claim costs
 can cause some firms
 to price too low and de-
 press other firms'
 prices. Cross-sectional
 analysis of insurer loss
 forecast revisions
 (which should be
 greater for firms with
 low prices caused by
 moral hazard or hetero-
 geneous information)
 and premium growth
 provides evidence con-
 sistent with low pricing
 due to moral hazard
 but not heterogeneous
 information. The evi-
 dence also implies that
 shifts in the loss distri-
 bution produced large
 industrywide forecast
 errors.
 * This research was sponsored by a grant from the Na-
 tional Association of Insurance Commissioners. An earlier
 version was presented at the 1991 meeting of the American
 Law and Economics Association. We thank Roy Brooks,
 Robert Klein, Greg Niehaus, Rodney Roenfeldt, Douglas Di-
 amond (the editor), and an anonymous referee for helpful
 comments and suggestions and Paul Kumagai for computer-
 programming assistance.
 (Journal of Business, 1994, vol. 67, no. 4)
 ? 1994 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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 inadequate given information available at the time policies were sold.
 Attendant operating losses contributed to the subsequent hard mar-
 ket.' The largest property-liability insurer insolvencies in the mid-
 1980s are asserted to have been caused by deliberate or irresponsible
 underpricing of GL insurance during the early 1980s. These insurers
 also are alleged to have deliberately underreported claim liabilities and
 used reinsurance to hide underpricing and capital inadequacy prior to
 failure (U.S. House of Representatives 1990).2
 Prior research has focused on causes of the mid-1980s price in-
 creases. Possible explanations include the effects on discounted ex-
 pected costs of declining interest rates and increases in the expected
 value and variance of claim cost distributions (Clarke et al. 1988; Har-
 rington 1988). Several studies consider whether unexpected increases
 in claim liabilities for prior years' policies, in conjunction with capital
 adjustment costs, led to large backward shifts in short-run supply
 (Winter 1988, 1991a; Gron 1989, 1992; Cummins and Danzon 1991).
 Price behavior prior to the mid-1980s increases, or in other soft market
 periods that have preceded abrupt price increases, has received little
 attention. Apart from possible fluctuations due to capital adjustment
 costs (Winter 1988, 1991a; Gron 1989, 1992), there has been no analysis
 of whether competition could cause prices in soft markets to fall below
 levels needed ex ante to cover expected costs and ensure solvency.3.
 This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of alleged
 underpricing of GL insurance during the early 1980s. We explore theo-
 retically whether competition among heterogeneous insurers can cause
 prices to fall temporarily below costs. In our analysis, some firms may
 price below cost because of moral hazard that results from limited
 liability, risk-insensitive guaranty programs, and uninformed or uncon-
 cerned consumers. Firms also may price below cost due to heteroge-
 neous information concerning future claim costs that results in low loss
 forecasts relative to full-information conditional expectations. Loss
 forecasting errors and consequent winner's curse effects may have
 been especially likely during the early 1980s because of large changes
 1. Industry analysts also commonly believe that prices in GL and other property-
 liability lines are cyclical with periods of rate inadequacy followed by substantial pre-
 mium increases and availability problems (e.g., Stewart 1984). Several studies provide
 evidence that insurer operating results exhibit second-order autocorrelation that is con-
 sistent with a cycle (e.g., Cummins and Outreville 1987; Smith 1989).
 2. The 1980s experience contributed to substantial changes in state solvency regula-
 tion, including the development of risk-based capital requirements, and it increased
 pressure for federal regulation.
 3. Using aggregate time-series data for property-liability insurance, Gron (1992) finds
 little support for any influence of changes in capital on price changes during soft markets.
 Winter's (1991a) empirical results using aggregate time-series data are inconsistent with
 the predictions of capital shock models during the early (and mid-) 1980s. Winter (1991b)
 provides an overview of capital shock explanations of fluctuations in price and avail-
 ability.
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 in the distribution of losses.4 In response to underpricing by some
 firms, our analysis suggests that other firms may cut prices to preserve
 market share and thus avoid loss of quasi rents from investments in
 tangible and intangible capital. Thus, a subset of firms can cause prices
 for other firms to fall below costs in the short run.5
 Our empirical analysis employs cross-sectional data from the early
 1980s to test whether moral hazard and/or heterogeneous information
 contributed to differences in prices and growth rates among firms.
 Thus, we assume that other firms' price responses to low prices due
 to moral hazard or heterogeneous information do not eliminate price
 variation. Price cutting by other firms would reduce price variation
 and thus reduce the power of our tests. Since the ideal data on price
 and quantity of business for homogeneous policies are not available,
 we analyze two related variables: (1) loss forecast revisions and
 (2) premium growth rates. A number of studies have analyzed multiline
 loss forecast revisions ("loss reserve errors") for property-liability
 insurers (Weiss 1985; Grace 1990; Petroni 1992). Our analysis is dis-
 tinctive in using loss forecast revisions to measure price differences
 and in analyzing the relationship between loss forecast revisions and
 premium growth.
 The moral hazard hypothesis predicts that firms with weak safety
 incentives will charge low prices and grow more rapidly than firms
 with higher target safety levels. The loss forecast revision for year t
 measures the extent to which an insurer subsequently updates its fore-
 cast of losses for accidents that occurred in year t. Forecast revisions
 will be influenced by unfavorable (or favorable) realizations in claim
 costs compared to full-information conditional expectations when poli-
 cies are sold. Forecast revisions will be inversely related to price,
 assuming that firms that price low due to moral hazard deliberately
 understate initial reported loss forecasts to hide inadequate prices from
 regulators and other interested parties but that positive forecast revi-
 sions become inevitable as paid claims accumulate.6 The percentage
 4. McGee (1986) speculated that insurers with optimistic loss forecasts may cause
 prices to fall below the level implied by industry average forecasts. Winter (1988, 1991b)
 mentions the possibility of heterogeneous information and winner's curse effects.
 5. Insurers that persisted in charging inadequate prices would either become insolvent
 or increase price and limit supply. Prior work suggests that sharp reductions in insurer
 capital could temporarily produce supra cost prices. While we do not analyze hard
 markets, inadequate prices due to moral hazard or heterogeneous information could
 contribute to erosion in capital and thus the severity of price increases in hard markets.
 In any case, if prices tend to become inadequate in the short run, they would eventually
 need to exceed costs in order for safer and better informed firms to make investments
 that generate quasi rents and earn fair rates of return over time.
 6. Loss reserve reporting involves substantial managerial discretion. Failed insurers
 commonly have inadequate reported losses and loss reserves (see A.M. Best Co. 1991).
 This problem was pronounced for GL insurance written in the early 1980s by insurers
 that subsequently became insolvent (see U.S. House of Representatives 1990). Petroni
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 growth in premiums (net of reinsurance) for year t should be positively
 correlated with quantity growth (net of reinsurance) if firm-level de-
 mand is elastic. Thus, premium growth should be greater for firms
 that price low due to moral hazard and positively related to forecast
 revisions, reflecting demand response to low prices.
 The heterogeneous information hypothesis predicts that firms with
 lower loss forecasts will charge lower prices and grow more rapidly
 than firms with higher forecasts. If prices vary due to differences in
 loss forecasts at the time of sale, less-informed firms should experience
 relatively greater upward forecast revisions over time as information
 accumulates. Hence, forecast revisions should again be inversely re-
 lated to price; positively related to measures of poor information, such
 as inexperience; and positively related to premium growth.
 We estimate reduced-form equations for loss forecast revisions and
 premium growth, including variables that measure propensity for low
 pricing due to moral hazard and heterogeneous information. We also
 estimate a structural model to test for a positive relation between pre-
 mium growth and forecast revisions. Our results using GL insurance
 data during 1980-82 provide evidence that is consistent with low pric-
 ing due to moral hazard and inconsistent with low pricing due to het-
 erogeneous information. The specific findings are as follows: (1) fore-
 cast revisions and premium growth were generally positively and
 significantly related to the amount of liabilities ceded to reinsurers,
 consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis that reinsurance was used
 to conceal low prices and excessive growth; (2) mutual insurers gener-
 ally had significantly lower forecast revisions and premium growth
 than stock insurers, consistent with mutuals being less prone to low
 pricing due to moral hazard; (3) measures of experience generally were
 not significantly related to both forecast revisions and premium
 growth, contrary to the heterogeneous information hypothesis; and
 (4) premium growth was positively and significantly related to forecast
 revisions, consistent with an inverse relation between forecast revi-
 sions and prices. We also provide evidence of large unfavorable real-
 izations in losses that were industrywide but more pronounced for
 reinsurers and insurers specializing in long-tailed GL sublines.
 Section II provides background and summary data on industrywide
 GL insurance premiums, losses, and operating margins. Section III
 presents the models of inadequate prices. Section IV describes the
 empirical methodology and data. Section V reports results. Section VI
 concludes.
 (1992) presents evidence that multiline loss forecast revisions by property-liability insur-
 ers are larger for financially weak insurers that may have greater incentive to understate
 initial forecasts.
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 II. General Liability Insurance Premiums, Losses, and
 Operating Margins
 Standard financial theory predicts that break-even premiums equal the
 risk-adjusted discounted value of expected cash outflows for claims,
 sales expenses, income taxes, and any other costs (e.g., Myers and
 Cohn 1986). We use the term "perfect markets model" to refer to
 this model, with the additional assumptions (1) that expectations are
 conditional on all information available when policies are sold and
 (2) that insurer capital is sufficient to produce a low level of insolvency
 risk. This terminology encompasses the notion of market efficiency
 (prices reflect full-information conditional expectations) and insurance
 markets characterized by free entry, by perfectly elastic supply of
 capital at a cost commensurate with risk, and by sufficient incentives
 for insurers to operate with low insolvency risk.
 In a strict sense, the hypothesis that insurance prices can be fully
 explained by the perfect markets model is surely false, given costs of
 information and adjusting supply. The key questions are whether
 prices deviate substantially from levels predicted by this model and,
 if so, what the causes of these deviations are. Answering these ques-
 tions is difficult, however, because full-information conditional expec-
 tations, risk-adjusted discount rates, and other factors (such as ex-
 pected cash flow patterns and tax liabilities) that affect break-even
 premium rates are unobservable. In particular, realized claim costs
 may differ substantially from full-information conditional expectations
 at the time of sale, and reported loss forecasts may be deliberately
 biased.
 Figures 1 and 2 present aggregate industry data for 1976-89 to illus-
 trate grounds for the debate over whether changes in GL premiums
 have been consistent with the perfect markets model and to provide
 background for our subsequent analysis. Figure 1 shows annual nation-
 wide earned premiums net of insurer operating expenses (agents' com-
 missions and other sales costs, including state premium taxes) in con-
 stant GNP-adjusted 1989 dollars.7 It also shows, again in constant
 dollars, discounted forecasts of claim costs for accidents occurring
 during the year, using year-end ("initial") reported loss forecasts, and
 discounted forecasts of claim costs for accidents in the same years,
 using updated loss forecasts. The updated forecasts are those reported
 at year-end 1989 for accident years 1980-89 and at year-end 1985 (the
 latest available data) for accident years 1976-79.8 Since coverage un-
 7. Using gross national product (GNP) to obtain constant dollars adjusts for changes
 in the overall price level and possible changes in the demand for coverage as a function
 of overall economic activity.
 8. Both the initial and updated loss forecasts were discounted by using an assumed
 cash flow schedule based on the claims payout pattern for accidents in 1980. As of
 year-end 1989, 11.8% of reported losses for accidents in 1980 were unpaid. A payout
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 (measured in billions of constant 1989 gross-national-product-adjusted dollars).
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 der policies sold in one year can extend into the next, claim costs for
 year t accidents arise from policies sold in years t and t - 1.9 The
 discounted forecasts are only for accidents occurring in the year; that
 is, they do not reflect forecast revisions for accidents in other years.
 Discounting of loss forecasts controls for the predicted effects of inter-
 est rate changes on discounted expected costs and thus break-even
 premiums.
 The perfect markets model implies that premiums less operating
 expenses should approximate forecasts at the time policies are sold of
 discounted expected claim costs and other costs (such as expected tax
 liabilities) not included in operating expenses. With accurate reporting,
 initial loss forecasts for year t would reflect expectations at the time
 policies were sold (in years t and t - 1), plus forecast revisions through
 year t. Updated loss forecasts would reflect revisions in forecasts be-
 tween the time policies were sold and year-end 1989 (or year-end 1985
 for accident years 1976-79). However, reported losses may deviate
 substantially from true loss expectations to the extent that insurers
 optimize loss reporting, given income tax rules and solvency monitor-
 ing by consumers and regulators (e.g., Weiss 1985), so that reported
 losses may deviate systematically from expectations.10
 As shown in figure 1, discounted initial loss forecasts and premiums
 less operating expenses fell during the early 1980s and increased
 sharply in 1985-86. Increasing (decreasing) interest rates during the
 former (latter) period account for at least part of this movement. But
 premiums less operating expenses declined more rapidly than dis-
 counted initial loss forecasts during the early 1980s and increased more
 rapidly during 1985-86. Large upward forecast revisions occurred
 through 1989 for policies sold in the early 1980s. If, as is suggested by
 industry analysts, initial loss forecasts were deliberately understated
 during the early 1980s, reported forecast revisions would exceed true
 forecast revisions.
 pattern of .03, .026, .022, .02, and .02 was assumed for years 11-15. The reported loss
 forecasts include paid losses plus loss reserves, which represent insurer forecasts of the
 ultimate cost of unpaid claims for accidents in the year (including forecasts of claims
 for accidents as yet unreported). They also include paid and estimated unpaid claim
 settlement expenses.
 9. The average yield on new issues of 5-year government bonds in years t and t - I
 was used to discount estimated future cash outflows for year t accidents. Similarly, the
 average operating expense ratio for years t and t - 1 was used to calculate approximate
 generally accepted accounting principles expenses, and average GNP for years t and
 t - 1 was used to calculate constant dollar amounts. "Earned" premiums (premium
 revenues from insurer income statements) are shown because they also correspond to
 policies sold in years t and t - 1. Changes in "written" premiums (less operating
 expenses), which represent cash inflows for policies sold during a given year only, were
 generally more pronounced than changes in earned premiums.
 10. Note also that absolute differences between initial and updated loss forecasts
 could well be smaller toward the end of the period shown simply because the forecasts
 are updated for fewer years.
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 Figure 2 shows annual operating margins (premiums less operating
 expenses less discounted loss forecasts, as a proportion of premiums)
 for GL insurance using both initial and updated loss forecasts. The
 initial operating margins declined substantially in the early 1980s and
 increased substantially in 1985-86 in conjunction with premium in-
 creases. The updated margins declined each year during 1979-84. They
 are negative for 1983-84, suggesting that premiums turned out to be
 insufficient to fund operating expenses and claim costs, let alone cover
 other costs.
 The aggregate data in figures 1 and 2 are at best suggestive. They
 could be consistent with the perfect markets model in conjunction with
 large unfavorable realizations in claim costs for accidents in the early
 1980s and slow revisions in loss forecasts (Harrington 1988). A sub-
 stantial shift in the loss distribution with slow learning might produce
 several consecutive years where ex post costs are much higher than
 ex ante full-information conditional expectations. Changes in risk-
 adjusted discount rates or other costs also might explain some of the
 variation in operating margins.11 As noted, these accounting data also
 could be influenced by deliberate understatement or overstatement of
 loss forecasts to manage reported income. But an alternative view of
 these data is that premiums declined during the early 1980s relative to
 discounted expected costs, that some insurers deliberately understated
 initial loss forecasts to mask deteriorating financial results caused by
 underpricing, and that underpricing ultimately contributed to the sharp
 premium increases of 1985-86.
 III. Models of Inadequate Insurer Prices
 Inadequate prices relative to ex ante full-information conditional ex-
 pectations of claim costs would contradict the perfect markets model;
 apparent price inadequacy ex post due to unfavorable realization of
 claim costs would not. We model prices that are potentially inadequate
 ex ante by introducing two types of heterogeneity among firms: differ-
 ent incentives for solvency and differences in loss forecasts that arise
 from heterogeneous information. An important assumption is that de-
 mand of many buyers is insensitive to default risk because of guaranty
 fund protection, information costs, or both.12 Different incentives for
 11. Evidence suggests that the market price of risk is positively related to interest
 rates (e.g., Ferson and Harvey 1991). If claim liabilities are positively correlated with
 aggregate returns on risky assets, risk-adjusted discount rates for losses could have
 increased more than yields on government bonds during the early 1980s when interest
 rates rose and less than bond yields when interest rates fell during 1985-86.
 12. If low-price, high-default risk insurers simply attract less risk-averse customers
 from high-price, low-default risk firms, the notion of inadequate prices becomes more
 ambiguous.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:41:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Price Cutting 519
 solvency are suggested by work on insurer capital structure and default
 risk (e.g., Munch and Smallwood 1980, 1982). Industry analysts treat
 heterogeneity in loss forecasts for comparable risks as an accepted
 fact (e.g., Stewart 1984). Intuitive explanations of the basic results
 follow. Appendix A contains a formal model.
 A. Moral Hazard
 Some firms may price too low because of weak incentives for safety
 and the moral hazard (MH) that arises when liability is limited, when
 demand is invariant to default risk, and when guaranty fund assess-
 ments against insurers are risk insensitive. Willingness to incur risk
 will differ across firms, reflecting the value of nontransferable tangible
 capital (some physical assets) and intangible capital that would be lost
 from insolvency (Munch and Smallwood 1982; Finsinger and Pauly
 1984; also see Herring and VanKudre 1987). Intangible capital consists
 of the value of reputation and any quasi rents on renewal business.
 Policyholder-specific intangible capital includes the investment in es-
 tablishing a book of business, including the cost of attracting and
 screening a new policyholder. Depending on policyholder turnover,
 the optimal pricing strategy to recoup this investment may be to charge
 an initial price below the first-year marginal cost, inclusive of this fixed
 cost, and to price above marginal cost on renewal business. Common
 intangible capital reflects the firm's investment in reputation for a high-
 quality product (promptness in claims handling, provision of other ser-
 vices, or, if policyholders care, low insolvency risk).13
 If a firm becomes insolvent, it loses its nontransferable tangible and
 intangible capital; that is, it loses its "franchise value." Shareholder
 wealth maximization implies that the firm's levels of financial capital
 and supply price are positively related to franchise value (see
 App. A). Firms with little franchise value have incentives to hold rela-
 tively little financial capital, price low, and have high insolvency risk.
 Alternatively, unfavorable realizations of claim costs or asset returns
 could lead to go-for-broke behavior in the form of low prices.
 If some firms price too low, firms with significant intangible capital
 will optimally reduce price within some range to mitigate loss of cus-
 tomers and associated quasi rents that are earned if customers renew.
 Thus, inadequate prices for some firms could cause inadequate prices
 for other firms. The long-run equilibrium price for a firm is positively
 related to investments in nontransferable tangible and intangible capi-
 tal and therefore must normally exceed the marginal per-policyholder
 13. Klein and Leffler (1981) show that in markets for experience goods, firms that
 invest in reputation for high quality will tend to charge prices above marginal cost in
 order to recoup the cost of this investment. Similarly, the cost of fixed investments in
 physical capital, such as claims-processing facilities, may be amortized over several
 years and recovered by pricing above marginal claims cost.
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 expected loss and expense cost, in order to earn a normal return. In
 the short run it is optimal to cut price to retain business as long as
 price exceeds marginal cost, even if price is below the long-run equilib-
 rium level.
 The possibility that MH will cause some firms to charge low prices,
 gain market share, and have high default risk clearly is not unique to
 insurance. It is another case in which low quality drives out high qual-
 ity when demand is insensitive to quality, due to either costly informa-
 tion or flat-rated insurance against the consequences of low quality.
 Characteristics that make liability insurance particularly vulnerable to
 MH-induced low prices include substantial, albeit limited, govern-
 ment-mandated guarantees of insurer obligations that were adopted in
 the early to mid-1970s and up-front payment of premiums coupled with
 average claim payout lags of 5 years or more on product liability and
 other long-tailed lines. In addition, losses fall on third-party claimants
 if the insurer defaults and the policyholder is judgment proof, and there
 exist formidable problems in regulatory detection and verification of
 inadequate prices or other forms of increased risk taking.
 The MH hypothesis predicts that firms with weak safety incentives
 will charge low prices and grow more rapidly than firms with higher
 target safety levels. As noted earlier, loss forecast revisions will be
 positively related to MH-induced low prices, assuming that firms delib-
 erately understate initial reported loss forecasts to hide inadequate
 prices from regulators but that positive forecast revisions become inev-
 itable as paid claims accumulate (see n. 6 above). Premium growth
 should be positively related to forecast revisions, reflecting demand re-
 sponse to low prices. As we explain in Section IV below, possible indica-
 tors of propensity for low pricing due to MH are use of reinsurance, orga-
 nizational form (stock vs. mutual), leverage, and investment mix.
 B. Heterogeneous Information
 With heterogeneous information (HI), some firms with optimistic pri-
 vate information on future claim costs may price too low relative to
 full-information conditional expectations and thus exert downward
 pressure on other firms' prices. In particular, HI could give rise to
 winner's curse effects, whereby some firms with optimistic information
 price too low, grow rapidly, and subsequently experience losses. Inad-
 equate prices due to HI would be especially likely for inexperienced
 firms.
 The sale of liability insurance to a unique risk is a form of common
 value auction. Public information for forecasting a risk's expected
 claim cost includes that provided by trade associations. Heterogeneous
 private information includes an insurer's own past experience on com-
 parable risks. Basing prices (bids) only on the conditional forecast,
 given the insurer's private information and public information, will
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 expose the insurer to a winner's curse even if these conditional fore-
 casts are unbiased. The reason is that the conditional expectation of
 loss given that the insurer sells the policy (i.e., has the lowest bid)
 exceeds the conditional forecast based on the insurer's private infor-
 mation and public information.
 The winner's curse can be avoided if bidders adjust their bids given
 knowledge of the bidding processes used by other firms and the joint
 density of public/private information and expected loss costs. If all
 firms bid optimally, under certain assumptions the winning bid con-
 verges to the true value of the object being bid for as the number of
 bidders increases (Wilson 1977; Milgrom 1979). These assumptions
 are strong, and convergence need not occur in practice. Plausibly,
 established firms have learned to adjust their forecasts to avoid the
 curse. However, if inexperienced firms, such as new entrants, make
 inadequate adjustments, they will price too low and exert downward
 pressure on other firms' prices.
 In markets for classes of homogeneous risks, which we model for-
 mally in Appendix A, rational behavior requires firms to infer other
 firms' information from market prices. This requires knowledge of the
 joint distribution of market prices and private information (e.g., Gross-
 man 1981). Under certain conditions, prices obtained in a rational ex-
 pectations equilibrium fully reveal diverse private information (e.g.,
 Jordan and Radner 1982). The necessary assumptions are again strong
 and unlikely to hold in insurance markets characterized by large shifts
 in loss distributions over time. If inexperienced firms place too much
 emphasis on their own information or draw incorrect inferences from
 other firms' actions, such firms with low forecasts and thus low prices
 will tend to grow rapidly, experience large unfavorable forecast errors,
 and create downward pressure on prices of firms with higher forecasts.
 Inadequate pricing due to HI is more likely when firm-level demand
 is elastic with respect to price but inelastic with respect to default
 risk, and when the market is characterized by easy entry and by slow
 resolution of uncertainty and thus slow learning about the accuracy of
 prior forecasts. Heterogeneity in forecasts will also be more pro-
 nounced when sources of information are diverse, when heterogeneous
 production or cost functions make it difficult to infer other firms' infor-
 mation, when the full-information conditional variance of claim costs
 is large, and when the effects of heterogeneity cannot be reduced by
 informed traders. Markets for long-tailed liability insurance exhibit
 most of these characteristics. In particular, both the mean and condi-
 tional variance of claim costs appear to have increased in the 1980s,
 making it more difficult to forecast losses.
 The HI hypothesis predicts that firms with lower loss forecasts will
 charge lower prices and grow more rapidly than firms with higher
 forecasts and prices. Low forecast/price firms also will be more likely
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 to sell any coverage and thus more likely to appear in our database
 than high forecast firms. Low forecast/price firms should experience
 relatively greater upward forecast revisions over time as information
 accumulates. Again, premium growth should be positively related to
 forecast revisions. Since low prices due to HI are more likely for
 inexperienced firms, possible indicators of propensity for low pricing
 include recent entry into the GL market and specialization in GL, as
 we explain further in Section IV."
 IV. Empirical Methodology and Data
 A. Loss Forecast Revisions and Premium Growth
 The loss forecast revision in year t, %FR, equals the percentage differ-
 ence between updated (through year t + 5) and initial (end-of-year t)
 loss forecasts for accidents in year t, net of reinsurance.15 The %FR
 reflects revisions in reported estimates of the ultimate value of claims,
 including paid claims and the estimated value of unpaid claims (includ-
 ing claims incurred but not reported) between years t and t + 5. Pre-
 mium growth, %GR, is the percentage growth in premiums written in
 year t, net of reinsurance.
 As discussed above, firms that price low due to MH or HI should
 have larger values of %FR and %GR, other things being equal. In
 addition, if %FR is inversely related to price, %GR should be posi-
 tively related to %FR. Apart from any MH or HI effects, %FR should
 reflect idiosyncratic and industrywide forecast error relative to full-
 information conditional expectations. The resulting differences across
 firms in %FR could reflect differences in business mix. Subsequent
 experience suggests that firms that specialized in risky long-tailed GL
 sublines would have large positive forecast revisions for policies sold
 during the early 1980s.16 Differences in premium growth across firms
 also will reflect any shifts in demand for product offerings and possibly
 any differential growth in expected claim and other costs per unit of
 coverage.
 We estimate reduced-form equations for %FR and %GR to test for
 MH and HI effects. We include variables that measure MH and HI
 14. The relationship between overall firm size and forecast revisions is ambiguous,
 as we explain in Sec. IV.
 15. At the time of our data, insurers did not report comparable loss forecasts before
 reinsurance.
 16. Differences in %FR across firms also will reflect any differences in incentives to
 manage (smooth) reported loss reserves (see Weiss 1985). Smoothing should be unre-
 lated to price, unless it reflects MH or HI, in which case our interpretation remains
 valid. Differences in %FR that are unrelated to price should be unrelated to growth.
 Thus, it is unlikely that management of loss reserves would lead to a false diagnosis of
 low pricing and more rapid growth due to MH or HI in our empirical tests.
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 propensities and variables that could affect %FR and %GR apart from
 MH or HI. A variable that is negatively (positively) related to price
 due to either MH or HI should be significantly and positively (nega-
 tively) related to both %FR and %GR. Significance in only one equa-
 tion would imply that a variable is unrelated to price and thus be
 inconsistent with MH or HI. We also estimate a structural model to
 test for a positive relation between %GR and %FR. As noted, our
 analysis assumes that matching price cuts by other firms do not elimi-
 nate cross-sectional price variation. By reducing price variation, price
 cuts by other firms in response to low prices due to MH or HI will
 reduce the power of our cross-sectional tests.
 B. Moral Hazard Variables
 Reinsurance. To test for low pricing due to MH, we include the
 ratio of reinsurance recoverable (on paid and unpaid losses and un-
 earned premiums) to assets as a measure of the transfer of liabilities
 to reinsurers. Solvency regulation monitors insurers' policy-related lia-
 bilities net of reinsurance if the reinsurer meets minimum require-
 ments. Thus, reinsurance enables insurers to reduce leverage (net of
 reinsurance) and to write more direct business, given their capital,
 without violating regulatory norms. The efficient hedging rationale for
 reinsurance purchases (Hoerger, Sloan, and Hassan 1990; Mayers and
 Smith 1990; Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson 1992) suggests that rein-
 surance demand will reflect the same determinants as the demand for
 insurance and other forms of corporate hedging. Nonetheless, reinsur-
 ance could also be used to conceal MH-induced low pricing, as is
 suggested by anecdotal evidence (see U.S. House of Representatives
 1990).
 General liability insurers wishing to price low and grow rapidly be-
 cause of MH during the early 1980s would be likely to reduce the
 effects on premium growth net of reinsurance (and leverage) by
 reinsuring large amounts of business.17 Much of this reinsurance would
 be expected to be purchased from low-quality reinsurers also subject
 to MH or to reduce growth and leverage without shifting significant
 risk to reinsurers. 8 However, given that the use of reinsurance to
 17. This behavior could have become more prevalent after the adoption of govern-
 ment-mandated guarantees of direct insurance obligations in the 1970s, and in response
 to unexpected increases in claim liabilities and any resultant go-for-broke behavior. The
 intensity of reinsurance regulation has increased since the late 1980s, partly in response
 to the perception that reinsurance was being used to conceal risk taking
 18. Some reinsurance arrangements allow insurers to increase reported capital by
 transferring undiscounted loss liabilities to reinsurers at prices that reflect discounting
 of these liabilities. Adiel (1993) discusses how these arrangements allow management
 of reported capital. Asymmetric information might also have enabled high-risk primary
 insurers to reinsure at prices unfavorable to reinsurers, but this scenario would require
 that reinsurers were unable to anticipate adverse selection.
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 conceal risk taking involves some cost (e.g., transaction costs and/or
 sharing of potential profits), insurers with low prices due to MH would
 be expected to have higher premium growth net of reinsurance than
 would higher priced firms.
 Thus, under the MH hypothesis, extensive use of reinsurance should
 be related to low prices and thus positively related to both %FR and
 %GR. A positive relation between reinsurance and %FR is not an
 unambiguous indicator of MH. Insurers that specialized in high-risk
 GL sublines may have reinsured heavily for purposes of efficient hedg-
 ing and may also have incurred relatively large unfavorable realizations
 in claim costs. But the business mix/hedging rationale does not predict
 systematically low prices and thus greater premium growth net of rein-
 surance for insurers with large amounts of reinsured liabilities. Positive
 correlation between direct (before reinsurance) premium growth and
 the use of reinsurance would be expected without MH because reinsur-
 ance can allow more direct business to be written safely without ex-
 panding capital proportionately. However, this function of reinsurance
 does not imply more rapid growth in premiums net of reinsurance.
 Mutual organization. We include a binary variable equal to one
 for mutual organizations and zero for stock firms. Sublines of GL that
 are vulnerable to large forecast errors (e.g., product liability) generally
 entail substantial managerial discretion in pricing. Theories of organi-
 zational form (Mayers and Smith 1988; Lamm-Tennant and Starks
 1993) and the limited ability of mutuals to raise capital predict that
 mutual insurers are less likely to write these risky lines. Thus, unob-
 served differences in business mix could produce a negative relation
 between mutual organization and %FR during a period characterized
 by large unfavorable realizations in claim costs. Under this perfect
 markets/business mix hypothesis, larger values of %FR for stock in-
 surers would reflect larger unintended forecast error, not intentional
 low pricing. Therefore, more rapid growth for stocks than mutuals is
 not predicted.
 Mutuals will be less likely than stocks to price low because of MH
 if managers (and possibly owner/customers) are averse to financial
 distress; that is, MH will be less severe for mutuals (Hansmann 1985;
 Garven 1987). Thus, like the perfect markets/business mix hypothesis,
 the MH hypothesis predicts that mutuals will experience lower %FR.
 However, since in this case lower %FR indicates higher prices, lower
 %GR for mutuals also is predicted. Lower growth is not expected if
 mutual organization is simply a proxy for specialization in low-risk
 lines.l9
 19. It conceivably might be argued that the inability of mutuals to issue equity could
 lead to slower growth for mutuals during a period of rapidly increasing market demand.
 This argument would not predict slower GL premium growth for mutuals in the early
 1980s when industry-wide premiums were declining relative to GNP.
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 Leverage and investment mix. Other risky strategies, such as op-
 erating with high financial leverage and/or holding a risky asset portfo-
 lio, could be correlated with intentional low pricing due to MH. The
 MH hypothesis suggests a possible nonmonotonic relationship be-
 tween leverage and risk taking, and hence a nonmonotonic relationship
 between leverage, %FR, and %GR. Up to some level, increased lever-
 age could discourage risk taking if firms try to protect their tangible
 and intangible capital. But if beyond a certain point, high leverage
 indicates little intangible capital or produces go-for-broke behavior,
 the effect of additional leverage on %FR and %GR should be positive.
 The ratio of gross liabilities (net liabilities plus reinsurance recover-
 able) to assets and the square of this ratio are included to measure
 gross financial leverage. Given the inclusion of reinsurance recover-
 able to assets, the coefficients for leverage estimate the effect of in-
 creases in unreinsured liabilities. This leverage measure has several
 limitations: it will understate true leverage if an insurer understates its
 claim liabilities, it is based on book rather than market values of liabili-
 ties and some assets, and it does not reflect the capitalized value of
 quasi rents. The ratio of the market value of common stock invest-
 ments to the book value of invested assets is included as a rough proxy
 for investment risk. Since the volatility of insurer accounting and, most
 likely, market returns increases with this variable, high values could
 indicate a propensity for high-risk behavior because of MH.20
 C. Heterogeneous Information Variables
 Entry. The HI hypothesis suggests that new entrants are more
 likely to price low on average due to optimistic forecasts and thus
 likely to have larger %FR and %GR.21 Lower prices (larger %FR)
 and more rapid growth are predicted for recent entrants with no prior
 property-liability insurance experience than for established insurers
 entering GL that have prior experience in other lines. More rapid
 growth by new entrants also might be consistent with the perfect mar-
 kets model. For example, an established firm with business in other
 lines might grow relatively rapidly on entering GL by marketing GL
 to its existing customers. However, the perfect markets model does
 not predict lower prices and thus higher %FR for entrants.
 Two binary indicators of new entrants are included to test for low
 pricing due to HI. The GL entrant variable indicates a recent entrant
 20. Increases in interest rates during the sample period likely reduced the market
 value of equity for many insurers given the long duration of their bond portfolios. While
 this may have been associated with MH, including go-for-broke behavior, we were
 skeptical of developing a useful measure of interest rate risk using available data.
 21. While we regard recent entry as primarily indicating possible effects of HI, new
 entrants also may have relatively less nontransferable tangible and intangible capital
 and thus may be more prone to MH.
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 to GL with experience in other lines. It equals one if the insurer did
 not write GL but did have positive net premiums written for other
 lines in 1976. The property-liability entrant variable equals one if the
 insurer had zero GL and zero other property-liability net premiums in
 1976 or was not included in the data as of 1976.22
 General liablility specialization. Holding total premiums constant,
 insurers that write a relatively large proportion of business in GL have
 greater line-specific experience in GL. Increased specialization in GL
 also would make GL pricing errors more costly, providing additional
 incentive to develop pricing expertise. Thus, the HI hypothesis implies
 that increased specialization in GL will be positively related to price
 and hence negatively related to %FR and %GR.
 We include the ratio of GL net premiums written to total net premi-
 ums written in year t - 1 to measure specialization in GL. A negative
 coefficient for this variable in the %GR equation also might be consis-
 tent with life-cycle effects; that is, holding size (total net premiums)
 constant, firms with greater GL premium volume in year t - 1 could
 have slower GL premium growth in year t. We therefore include the
 ratio of total GL net premiums written from 1976 through year t - 2
 ("prior" GL premiums) to total net premiums written in year t - 1
 as an additional measure of experience in the GL equation. This vari-
 able might be less affected by life-cycle effects.
 D. Other Variables
 We include the log of assets in the %FR equation and the log of total
 net premiums written in the %GR equation to control for any size-
 related effects, recognizing that these variables are unlikely to provide
 unambiguous evidence of MH or HI. If small firms in the sample are
 more likely to have low forecasts because of inexperience, or have
 weaker incentives for safety due to lower intangible capital per unit of
 output, size should be negatively related to %FR and %GR due to HI
 and MH, respectively. However, if large firms typically write higher
 limits and riskier coverages than small firms, and these coverages ex-
 perienced larger industrywide or idiosyncratic forecast errors during
 the early 1980s, these unobserved differences in business mix could
 lead to a positive relation between %FR and size. Thus, while a sig-
 nificant negative estimate for size in the %FR equation might provide
 strong evidence of low prices due to MH and/or HI, an insignificant
 or positive estimate would not be contradictory. In addition, simple
 22. The A.M. Best tapes at the University of Pennsylvania contain data from 1976
 onward. The number of entrants in the regression sample was small each year, ranging
 from 16 in 1980 to 25 in 1982. Entrants' share of GL net written premiums (before
 excluding extreme values, see below) ranged from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 3.6 percent in
 1982.
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 life-cycle models of firm growth suggest that small firms will grow
 more rapidly than large firms for any given price.
 Three variables are included as rough controls for insurer business
 mix. Binary variables indicate reinsurers and direct writers, as classi-
 fied by the A.M. Best Company. Reinsurers commonly write high-
 limits, excess-of-loss coverage for GL. Since unfavorable realizations
 in claim costs have a much bigger effect on excess-of-loss than on
 primary coverage, %FR will likely be greater for reinsurers during the
 early 1980s. There are no strong predictions for direct writers versus
 independent agency insurers. Direct writers generally specialize in pro-
 viding coverage to small to medium-sized businesses. The vulnerability
 of this coverage to large unfavorable realizations in claim costs might
 differ from coverage sold by independent agency insurers. Direct writ-
 ers are likely to have greater intangible capital or firm-specific invest-
 ments at risk. However, many independent agents also have intangible
 capital at stake that could cause them to avoid dealing with risky insur-
 ers. Relative growth rates for direct writers and agency insurers could
 vary for reasons unrelated to MH and/or HI (e.g., technological and
 demand changes that favor a particular distribution method). Finally,
 as a rough control for specialization in long-tailed lines of GL, we
 include the ratio of cumulative paid claims, as of year t + 5, for
 accidents in year t to the updated forecast, as of year t + 5, of losses
 for accidents in year t.23 If longer-tailed risks experienced greater unan-
 ticipated shifts in the loss distribution, this variable will be negatively
 related to %FR.
 E. Estimation Procedure and Data
 We estimated the %FR and %GR equations using annual data for 1980,
 1981, and 1982 for over 200 insurance company groups and unaffiliated
 companies that survived until 1985, 1986, and 1987, respectively. The
 variable %FR is only available for firms that survive through year
 t + 5. Results of additional tests (see App. B), including estimation of
 the %GR reduced form equation including firms that did not survive,
 suggest that survivor bias is unlikely to have a substantive impact on
 the reported results. We used weighted least squares to estimate the
 reduced-form equations and weighted two-stage least squares for the
 structural equation for %GR. Two-stage least squares was used in the
 latter case because %FR and %GR should be jointly determined if
 %FR reflects price differences and because %FR is a noisy measure
 23. For 1981 and 1982, we use the values of this ratio for accident years 1980 and
 1981, respectively, to reduce possible spurious correlation between this variable and
 %FR. Since we did not have data on updated accident-year loss forecasts for 1979, for
 1980 we use the value of the ratio for 1980. Similar results were obtained when this
 variable was omitted.
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 TABLE 1 Mean and Tenth-, Twenty-fifth-, Fiftieth-, Seventy-fifth-, and
 Ninetieth-Percentile Values of Cross-sectional Distributions of Loss
 Forecast Revisions (%FR) and Growth in Net Premiums Written
 (%GR)
 1980 1981 1982
 Variable and Statistic (%) (%) (%)
 Loss forecast revision
 (% FR):
 Mean 18.6 29.3 39.0
 90 74.2 110.6 119.6
 75 36.1 38.3 61.9
 50 7.4 11.3 19.9
 25 - 11.7 - 11.6 -8.1
 10 -30.1 -27.0 -26.1
 Growth in net premiums
 written (%GR):
 Mean 1.5 2.0 1.7
 90 31.6 28.4 31.1
 75 9.8 9.7 9.9
 50 .4 -3.8 -3.2
 25 - 10.5 - 16.0 - 14.5
 10 -21.8 -27.1 -38.6
 N 238 242 245
 NOTE.-%FR is the percentage change in the reported loss forecast for accidents in year t between
 years t and t + 5; %GR is the percentage change in net premiums written between years t and
 t - 1.
 of price. The weights used to control for heteroscedasticity are related
 to size in the %GR equation and to GL premium volume and the
 reinsurer and mutual dummies in the %FR equation. Unweighted data
 produced similar results. Unless otherwise noted, all regressors are
 lagged 1 year relative to the dependent variable. Estimation methods
 and data sources are described further in Appendix B.
 V. Empirical Results
 Table 1 shows means and selected percentile values of the cross-
 sectional distributions of annual values of %FR and %GR during
 1980-82. The data on %FR indicate substantial and increasing forecast
 revisions over the period. For 1982, the mean and median %FR were
 39% and 20%, respectively, compared to 19% and 7% in 1980. While
 low initial loss forecasts and positive forecast revisions are consistent
 with MH or HI, the large magnitude of the mean and median values
 of these revisions suggests large and industry-wide unfavorable realiza-
 tions in claim costs.
 Table 2 reports the reduced-form %FR and %GR equations. Overall,
 the results provide evidence of low pricing due to MH but not due to
 HI. The estimated coefficient for the ratio of reinsurance recoverable
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 TABLE 2 Cross-sectional Tests for Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Information
 Effects on Loss Forecast Revisions (%FR) and Growth in Net
 Premiums Written (%GR)-Weighted Least-Squares Estimation of
 %FR and %GR Reduced-Form Equations
 1980 1981 1982
 Variables %FR %GR %FR %GR %FR %GR
 A. Moral hazard:
 Intercept 1.120 .648 1.804 .575 2.452 .772
 (1.68) (1.63) (1.87) (1.40) (2.88) (2.17)
 Reinsurance
 recoverable/assets 1.639 .572 .588 1.029 2.654 .587
 (3.05) (1.94) (.86) (3.37) (4.06) (2.01)
 Mutual - .142 - .075 -.372 - .130 - .264 - .030
 (-2.06) (-1.81) (-3.90) (-2.92) (-2.93) (-.71)
 Liabilities/assets -.601 -.121 -1.856 -.470 -1.621 -1.241
 (-.62) (-.14) (-1.71) (.96) (-1.50) (-2.66)
 (Liabilities/
 assets) squared - .250 - .049 1.047 .029 - .008 .391
 (-.40) (-.14) (1.53) (.09) (-.01) (1.24)
 Common stocks/
 invested assets -.086 -.194 .288 .035 .076 -.001
 (-.26) (-1.07) (.73) (.20) (.21) (-.01)
 B. Heterogeneous
 information:
 GL entrant -.146 -.086 -.284 .325 -.053 .383
 (-.70) (-.82) (-.92) (2.45) (-.21) (3.50)
 PL entrant -.174 .091 -.372 .104 -.000 .295
 (- 1.10) (.97) (-3.90) (1.12) (-.00) (3.73)
 GL premiums/
 total premiums - .148 - .132 - .444 - .381 - .160 - .609
 (-.84) (- .81) (-1.81) (-2.33) (- .70) (-3.84)
 Prior GL premiums/
 total premiums ... - .126 ... - .027 ... .110
 (-1.52) (-.60) (3.70)
 C. Control:
 Log of assets -.017 ... -.035 ... .006 ...
 (-.72) (-1.03) (.20)
 Log of total net
 premiums written ... -.021 ... -.021 ... -.005
 (-1.61) (-1.37) (-.36)
 Reinsurer .426 - .002 .558 - .093 .603 .042
 (2.76) (-.04) (2.70) (-1.28) (3.53) (.66)
 Direct writer - .039 .075 .054 .108 -.048 .047
 (-.53) (1.72) (.53) (2.21) (-.49) (1.02)
 Cumulative paid/
 updated loss fore-
 cast - .185 -.100 -.092 .126 -1.412 -.040
 (- .70) (- .72) (- .25) (.79) (-4.45) (- .30)
 N 237 234 240 240 244 244
 NOTE.-%FR and %GR were divided by 100 prior to estimation. Regressors are based on data
 available at the beginning of the year (t - 1), except for cumulative paid/updated loss forecast for
 1980, which reflects data at year-end 1980. "Prior GL premiums" denotes general liability premiums
 from 1976 through year t - 2. PL = property-liability. The weights used are described in Appendix
 B. Values in parentheses are t-statistics.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:41:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 530 Journal of Business
 to assets is uniformly positive in both the %FR and %GR equations
 and generally significant. This result supports the MH hypothesis that
 reinsurance was used to conceal low prices and excessive growth. It
 seems unlikely that the positive effects in both equations are due in-
 stead to possible correlation between the use of reinsurance and spe-
 cialization in coverage that experienced large shifts in the loss distribu-
 tion. This alternative explanation does not explain the relationship
 between reinsurance and premium growth (net of reinsurance). The
 findings for mutuals also provide some support for the MH hypothesis.
 Mutuals had lower estimated %FR and %GR in all 3 years. The esti-
 mates for %FR are significant in all 3 years, and the estimated growth
 differential is significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test for 2 of
 the 3 years. While lower %FR for mutuals could be influenced by
 specialization in less risky GL lines, risk specialization cannot readily
 explain lower %GR for mutuals.
 Leverage (liabilities/assets), leverage squared, and the common
 stock ratio are generally insignificant in both equations. These results
 suggest that any low pricing due to MH was not related to these vari-
 ables. As noted earlier, however, if firms attempted to conceal inten-
 tional risk taking by underreporting liabilities, reported leverage con-
 tains measurement error that will tend to bias against finding the
 correlation expected under the MH hypothesis. The common stock
 ratio also is an imperfect indicator of investment risk.
 The results generally do not support the hypothesis of low pricing
 due to HI. While there is some evidence that new entrants grew more
 rapidly (three of the six coefficients for entrants are positive and sig-
 nificant in the %GR equations), entrants did not experience larger fore-
 cast revisions, as expected if higher growth was induced by lower
 prices. This suggests that the more rapid growth of entrants was attrib-
 utable to life-cycle effects rather than low prices. The ratio of GL
 premiums to total premiums is negatively and significantly related to
 %GR in 1981 and 1982, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
 firms with less GL experience grew more rapidly. However, since
 the estimated relationship is negative but not significant in the %FR
 equation, the relationship in the %GR equation may more likely be
 due to life-cycle effects than to systematic underpricing. The erratic
 results for cumulative prior GL experience are also inconsistent with
 the HI hypothesis.
 The results for reinsurers are consistent with large unfavorable real-
 izations in claim costs. When other characteristics are controlled for,
 reinsurers experienced larger upward revisions in loss forecasts, with
 the estimated differential increasing from 43% in 1980 to 60% in 1982.
 The fact that reinsurers did not grow more rapidly suggests that larger
 forecast revisions were not caused by low prices due to MH or HI.
 The large negative coefficient for the ratio of cumulative paid losses
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 TABLE 3 Cross-sectional Tests for a Relationship between Growth in Net
 Premiums Written (%GR) and Loss Forecast Revisions (%FR)-
 Weighted Two-Stage Least-Squares Estimation of %GR Structural
 Equation
 1980 1981 1982
 Intercept .408 - .025 .060
 (1.15) (- .04) (.16)
 Loss forecast revision (%FR) .303 .526 .190
 (2.24) (3.31) (2.30)
 Log of total net premiums written -.018 -.013 -.019
 (-1.28) (-.55) (-1.35)
 GL premiums/total premiums -.221 -.218 -.200
 (-1.93) (-1.14) (-1.64)
 GL entrant -.020 .527 .349
 (-.18) (2.48) (2.89)
 PL entrant .165 .051 .209
 (1.76) (.38) (2.53)
 Mutual - .019 .071 .020
 (- 1.41) (.75) (.40)
 Reinsurer - .130 - .366 - .057
 (-1.37) (-2.61) (- .63)
 Direct writer .078 .071 .063
 (1.71) (.94) (1.25)
 Cumulative paid/updated loss
 forecast - .093 .145 .255
 (-.62) (.56) (1.36)
 N 234 240 244
 NOTE.-%FR is treated as endogenous; %GR should be positively related to %FR if %FR is
 inversely related to price. Regressors are based on data available at the beginning of the year
 (t - 1), except for cumulative paid/updated loss forecast for 1980, which reflects data at year-end
 1980. Data are weighted by the square root of log GL (general liability) net premiums written in year
 t - 1. PL = property-liability. Values in parentheses are t-statistics.
 to updated loss forecasts (an inverse proxy for firms specializing in
 long-tailed business) in the %FR equation but not the %GR equation
 for 1982 also suggests large industywide forecast errors on long-tailed
 business. The coefficients on the size and direct writer variables gener-
 ally are insignificant, as expected if these variables reflect several fac-
 tors with offsetting effects.
 Table 3 reports weighted two-stage least-squares estimates of the
 structural equation for %GR, treating %FR as endogenous. Leverage,
 reinsurance recoverable to assets, and common stocks to assets are
 identifying predetermined variables. This equation allows a test of
 whether %FR reflected price differences that in turn affected growth
 rates. %GR is significantly and positively related to %FR in all three
 years, consistent with %FR being inversely related to price.24 This
 24. The results for this variable were somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of several
 (two to four) potential outliers each year. When these observations were excluded, the
 coefficients and t-values for %FR in the premium growth equation were .163 (1.33) for
 1980, .867 (1.73) for 1981, and .319 (2.71) for 1982.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:41:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 532 Journal of Business
 result cannot be readily explained by unfavorable realizations in claim
 costs that are unrelated to price. It is consistent with the hypothesis
 that some firms charged lower prices due to either MH or HI, experi-
 enced large upward forecast revisions, and grew more rapidly.
 VI. Conclusions
 Our theoretical analysis suggests that moral hazard can lead insurers
 with few assets at risk to price too low. We also have analyzed how
 low prices might arise from heterogeneous information across firms.
 In either case, firms that price too low will gain market share (assuming
 other firms do not fully match the price cuts), unless policyholders
 understand and internalize the risks, which is unlikely because of guar-
 anty fund protection and information costs. Inadequate prices by some
 firms may cause other firms to cut price to retain business that yields
 quasi rents in future periods. Thus, inadequate pricing by some firms
 can induce inadequate pricing by other firms in the short run.
 Our empirical analysis uses loss forecast revisions (which should be
 inversely related to prices) and premium growth net of reinsurance for
 GL during 1980-82 to test for evidence of moral hazard and heteroge-
 neous information effects. Our results provide evidence of low pricing
 due to moral hazard but not due to heterogeneous information. The
 reduced-form results suggest that some insurers used reinsurance to
 conceal low prices and excessive growth. Forecast revisions and pre-
 mium growth were significantly and positively related to the amount
 of liabilities ceded to reinsurers, controlling for the influence of other
 firm characteristics. The former result also could reflect efficient hedg-
 ing, by reinsuring sublines of GL that were more vulnerable to unfavor-
 able realizations in claim costs. However, efficient hedging and the
 expected effects of reinsurance on direct premium growth (before rein-
 surance) cannot readily explain the positive relationship between the
 use of reinsurance and premium growth net of reinsurance. The results
 also suggest that mutual firms, which should be less subject to moral
 hazard, maintained higher prices and grew less rapidly. Forecast revi-
 sions and premium growth were significantly smaller for mutuals. The
 former result could indicate specialization by mutuals in less risky
 sublines of GL (see Lamm-Tennant and Starks 1993), but risk special-
 ization cannot readily explain slower premium growth for mutuals.
 Our structural equation results provide evidence of a significantly
 positive relationship between premium growth and loss forecast revi-
 sions. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that forecast
 revisions are inversely related to prices due to either moral hazard or
 heterogeneous information. However, the reduced-form results pro-
 vide little evidence that inexperience contributed significantly to inade-
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:41:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Price Cutting 533
 quate pricing and rapid growth. New entrants and firms with relatively
 low premium volume in GL generally did not experience both larger
 forecast revisions and more rapid growth, as expected under the het-
 erogeneous information hypothesis. Other findings are consistent with
 substantial unanticipated shifts in the underlying loss distribution that
 produced large industry-wide forecast errors, particularly for rein-
 surers and for insurers specializing in long-tailed GL sublines.
 Our findings regarding moral hazard-and the possibility that inade-
 quate prices due to moral hazard contributed to subsequent insolven-
 cies and to the hard market of 1985-86-support increased concern
 by policy makers with regard to intentional risk taking and the use
 of reinsurance and underreporting of loss reserves to mask high-risk
 behavior. Future research may be able to develop better measures of
 propensity for low pricing and other forms of intentional risk taking,
 of inexperience, and of competitors' responses and thus help better
 distinguish these influences during soft markets. As noted earlier, any
 tendency toward inadequate pricing in insurance markets cannot con-
 tinue indefinitely; soft markets must eventually be followed by harder
 markets. Another important area for future research is the transition
 from soft to hard markets and whether the alternation of soft and hard
 markets is in fact a self-generating cycle.
 Appendix A
 An Illustrative Model
 We consider a monopolistically competitive insurance market with limited
 liability and claim risk that cannot be eliminated by writing a portfolio of
 policies. The monopolistic competition model allows for price variation and
 for some degree of brand loyalty. Consumers do not necessarily buy from the
 lowest-priced insurer, but they can be attracted to another insurer by a low
 enough price. Limited liability, undiversifiable claim risk, and heterogeneity
 in either intangible capital or loss forecasts produce endogenous default risk
 and differences in pricing incentives across firms. Our basic approach extends
 the model of Finsinger and Pauly (1984) by allowing for firm heterogeneity
 and for firm price and thus output to be endogenous.
 Firm demand q(p, s) depends on own price p and the price of a representa-
 tive other firm s, with qp < 0, q, > 0, and qp, > 0. At time 0 the firm chooses
 p, invests financial capital of k per policy, and incurs nonloss operating costs
 of C(q), with C' > 0, and C" > 0. It pays claims at time 1. Demand is insensitive
 to default risk (qk = 0). The firm has intangible capital A, which is invested
 at time 0 and is marketable prior to investment. On the basis of Finsinger
 and Pauly (1984), firms cannot add financial capital after claims are realized.
 Comparable results can be obtained as long as adding financial capital at time
 1 is more costly than at time 0 if funds are insufficient to pay claims at time
 1. If premiums and financial capital equal or exceed claim costs at time 1,
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 residual claimants receive A and any excess funds. If not, the firm defaults
 and forfeits A. The key results only require that A decline if premiums and
 financial capital are less than claim costs.
 Firms maximize the net present value of residual claims. Residual claimants
 are risk neutral, and the interest rate is zero. Investing financial capital incurs
 a cost (e.g., due to tax effects, as in Myers and Cohn 1986) at time 0 of Tper
 dollar invested. At time 1 the mean loss per policy sold is x with cumulative
 distribution function F(x), reflecting risk that remains after the insurer writes
 a large portfolio of policies. This undiversifiable risk at the firm level could be
 caused by parameter uncertainty or correlation in losses across policies. Firms
 sell enough policies to eliminate idiosyncratic risk via the law of large numbers
 so that F(x) does not depend on q.
 Consider first the case in which all firms know F(x) at time 0. A given firm
 correctly perceives that it will default if x > p + k with probability 1 - F(p
 + k). If x 2 p + k, the firm is worthless to residual claimants; if x < p + k,
 its value is A + (p + k - x)q(p, s). The firm chooses p and k to maximize
 expected net present value (dropping arguments of the demand function):
 p + k
 V = f [A + (p + k - x)q]f(x)dx - C(q) - (1 + T)kq - A.
 This can be written
 V = qm - C(q) - [1 - F(p + k)]A, (Al)
 where
 p+ k
 m = f (p + k - x)f(x)dx - (1 + T)k (A2)
 is the expected margin between p and per-policy claim and capital costs. From
 (1), policies will have zero expected net present value if
 C(q) + [1 - F(p + k)]A (A)
 q q
 that is, the expected margin m between p and per-policy claim and capital
 costs must equal average operating costs plus the expected loss of A (per
 policy) from default.
 The first-order conditions are
 Vp = qpm + qmp - C'(q)qp + f(p + k)A = 0, (A4a)
 and
 Vk= qmk +f(p + k)A = 0, (A4b)
 where mp = F(p + k), the probability of survival, and mk = F(p + k) -
 (1 + T) < 0. The second-order conditions are Vpp < 0, Vkk < O, and VppVkk -
 Vkp Vpk> 0.
 The first two terms in (A4a) give the expected reduction in qm from an
 increase in p. The last two terms give the expected reduction in operating
 costs and the expected cost of forfeiting intangible capital. Since qmp and f(p
 + k) are positive and qp < 0, (A4a) requires m > C'(q). When A = 0, Vk is
 negative (Mk < 0) for any value of k, and the firm will not commit financial
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 capital. If A > 0, the firm has an incentive to commit financial capital to reduce
 the likelihood that it forfeits its intangible capital.
 Comparative statics for this model (available from us) give PA > 0 and kA
 > 0. Hence, larger intangible capital leads to greater financial capital, higher
 prices, and lower default risk. An important implication is that if A differs
 across firms, high A firms are vulnerable to low prices charged by low A firms.
 Unless some consumers have a strong preference for high A firms, low A firms
 would be expected to dominate the market over time. Similarly, if exogenous
 influences led to a sharp reduction in A, a firm's optimal price (and financial
 capital) would drop significantly, so that it might go for broke.
 To introduce differences in loss forecasts across firms, consider a firm whose
 estimate differs from the mean loss by 0 in each state of the world; that is, it
 assumes that the mean loss is given by y = x + 0 with g(y) = f(x) and E(y)
 = E(x) + 0. The firm believes that it will forfeit A if y > p + k, which implies
 x > p + k - 0. The firm's (perceived) expected net present value to residual
 claimants is then given by (Al) with y replacing x. After performing the change
 of variable y = x + 0, the expressions for V, m, VP, and Vk are identical to
 (A1)-(A4) except that x + 0 replaces x and p + k - 0 replaces p + k.
 Comparative statics indicate that po > 0; the sign of ko is ambiguous. Thus,
 firms with loss forecasts lower than E(x) (0 < 0) charge lower prices. Such
 firms also perceive that they break even (V = 0) at a lower price. If the
 distribution of 0 across firms has mean zero and is symmetrically distributed,
 the model suggests that the average price will be less than if all firms know
 the true distribution of mean loss since firms with negative 0 will sell more
 coverage than firms with zero or positive values. The more elastic is firm
 demand, the greater would be the downward pressure on average price. An-
 other implication is that firms with 0 < 0 would be more likely to sell any
 coverage than firms with 0 > 0, at least in the short run.
 The optimal adjustment of p to a change in the price of another firm depends
 on the sign of Vpk, which is ambiguous if A > 0. However, if k is held constant,
 then pS > 0, decreases in prices charged by other firms reduce a firm's optimal
 price. Once the firm has invested A and incurred operating costs of C(q), a
 reduction in output by one unit reduces the expected net present value of the
 firm by m > 0, where m is increasing in A (see eq. [A3]). Thus, the firm has
 an incentive to cut price to preserve m. Price cuts are more likely if the firm
 can selectively cut price only to customers with relatively elastic demand.
 Finally, with policy-specific intangible capital, intuition suggests that firms
 would have additional incentive to cut prices to avoid losing quasi rents on
 established business.
 Appendix B
 Further Details on Data and Estimation
 Data used to calculate %FR and the ratio of cumulative paid losses to updated
 loss forecasts were Schedule P data provided by the National Association of
 Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). Written premium data and data for the
 exogenous variables were obtained from A.M. Best data tapes maintained by
 the Center for Research on Risk and Insurance at the University of Pennsylva-
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 nia. The NAIC data for individual companies with common ownership were
 consolidated to a group basis using A.M. Best group definitions. All groups
 or unaffiliated companies with at least $250,000 in net premiums written for
 the regression sample year and the prior year were eligible. Observations with
 implausibly large values for any of several variables were excluded. The
 thresholds used were 10, for the firms' initial and updated loss forecast divided
 by earned premiums, the difference between these ratios, and %FR (divided
 by 100); and 15, for percent growth (divided by 100) in net or direct general
 liability premiums.
 Regression diagnostics were calculated for initial specifications using the
 SAS "Influence" option (see Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 1980). A number of
 influential observations were identified and excluded, primarily on the basis
 of either large studentized residuals (e.g., absolute value greater than 7), large
 standardized changes in an estimated coefficient when an observation was
 deleted from the sample (e.g., absolute value greater than 1.5), or both. Unless
 otherwise noted, these exclusions did not have a strong effect on the key
 variables related to the MH and HI hypotheses. The exclusions generally
 mitigated positive skewness in the ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals for
 the reduced forms. We also estimated some of the equations using logarithms
 of the endogenous variables and obtained essentially similar results.
 To control for heteroscedasticity when estimating the reduced-form %FR
 equation, we assumed that log (u 2) = a + b(1IP) + cR + dM, where Cr2 iS
 disturbance variance, P is earned GL premiums (net of reinsurance), R is a
 zero-one dummy variable equal to one for reinsurers, and M is a zero-one
 dummy variable equal to one for mutuals. We used the logs of the squared
 OLS residuals to estimate parameters and calculate appropriate weights for
 weighted least squares estimation. This procedure constrains the estimated
 variances to be positive. The estimates of b and c were generally positive and
 significant; the estimate of d was usually negative and significant. In the %GR
 equations, we assumed that disturbance standard deviation was proportional
 to the log of lagged GL insurance premiums written. Results using unweighted
 data were similar.
 We estimated the %GR reduced-form equation for a sample that included
 firms that later failed. The estimates produced comparable results, suggesting
 that survivor bias is not serious. We also estimated the %GR equation includ-
 ing several alternative dummy variables for firms that later exited. The esti-
 mated coefficients were generally small and insignificant. This result suggests
 that factors leading to firm-specific financial problems, including effects of MH
 and HI, were captured by the remaining variables or that rapid growth by
 some firms in our sample that subsequently went insolvent was at least par-
 tially offset by slow growth for others that were already retrenching.
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